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Ideological Integration in Democratic Party Platforms, 1956-1980

Joel Paddock, Southwest Missouri State University

A number of scholars have noted that in recent decades the traditionally decentralized Ameri
can party has been replaced by a more nationalized organization. In the Democratic party this nation
alization was associated with the establishment of national standards in the selection of convention
delegates, and growing issue-oriented activism. In this study, state and national Democratic party
platforms between 1956 and 1980 were content analyzed to determine the extent, if any, of ideological
nationalization in the Democratic party. The data show a modest movement toward intra-party inte
gration, but give little hint of the development of a highly ideological and nationalized party.

Traditionally, one of the most notable aspects of the American party
system has been its decentralization. E.E. Schattschneider, for example,
contended that decentralization was “the single most important character
istic of the American major party’’ (Schattschneider 1942,129). In the last
two decades, however, scholars have noted a greater integration of the
major party organizations, as the national committees in both parties have
sought to exert greater influence over their state and local organizations
(Bibby 1979; Kayden 1980; Epstein 1982; Conway 1983; Shafer 1983;
Pomper 1984; Wekkin 1984, 1985; Kayden and Mahe 1985; Frantzich
1986). “Both Democrats and Republicans,’’ writes Wekkin (1985, 35)
“have evolved from loose confederations into more federalized structures
within which the various party organizations share resources, such as
money and technology, as well as functional responsibilities, such as
recruitment, research, and delegate selection.’’ In the Democratic party
this increasing integration started with the establishment of national stan
dards in the selection of national convention delegates during the 1960s
(Shafer 1983, 1988). Beginning with the national party’s compromise
with the Mississippi party over the seating of their all-white delegation in
1964, and the McGovem-Fraser Commission reforms of the early 1970s,
the national Democratic party “laid down, and was sustained by the courts
in enforcing, rules to which state parties must conform on pain of exclu
sion from the convention’’ (Williams 1984, 30).
The nationalizing reforms in the Democratic presidential nominating
process, as well as changes in the class structure associated with the
movement towards a postindustrial society, contributed to an increasing
prominence of amateur, issue-oriented activists at Democratic national
conventions in the 1960s and 1970s (Kirkpatrick 1976; Ladd and Hadley
1978; Costain 1980; Miller and Jennings 1986). Unlike the pragmatic,
job-oriented party professionals of the New Deal era and before, the new
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activists tended to eschew accommodationist politics in favor of a more
programmatic and even ideological politics. According to a number of
scholars, this led to the development of a more nationalized and ideologi
cal party system. Lunch (1987) writes:
The distinction between the decentralized old parties and the new national
ones may seem to be academic hairsplitting, but the old local and state parties
were organized around the material rewards available in politics, whereas the
new national parties are organized around ideological goals, or at least ideas.
Parties pursuing ideas, causes, and the moralization of public policy behave
very differently from parties that seek only jobs, contracts, and advantages for
supporters (224).

Such a system, if it indeed developed, more closely approximates the
issue-oriented national parties of the responsible party model than the
traditionally non-ideological and decentralized American party system
(Reichley 1985).
A question which has not been adequately addressed in the scholarly
literature is the extent to which state Democratic parties adopted the
national party’s public policy agenda during the 1960s and 1970s. At a
time when the party was becoming more nationalized through the estab
lishment of binding party rules (and later on through the growing role of
the Democratic National Committee as a vendor of campaign services and
money), did the state organizations become ideologically closer to the
national party? Did Democratic organizations, in Reichley’s words, move
toward an “increased commitment to a clearly defined ideology?” (Reich
ley 1985, 196). Or did they continue to be isologues in the federal party
structure, pragmatically responding to the specific interests of their con
stituencies? Research on Republican organizations during this period of
growing organizational nationalization shows only minimal ideological
integration (Paddock 1991). Through a content analysis of national
Democratic platforms and eleven state Democratic platforms over a
twenty-four year period, the degree of ideological integration in the Demo
cratic party will be examined.1
Content Analyzing Party Platforms
Party platforms were chosen to measure the extent of ideological na
tionalization in the Democratic party because they represent, in Ginsberg’s
(1972, 607) words, “an amalgamation and distillation of the principles,
attitudes, appeals, and concerns of the party as a whole, or at least its domi
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nant factions.” ‘‘Changes in the character of platform statements over
time,” he writes, ‘‘reflect changes within the party and/or changes in the
segment of the electorate to which the party appeals” (1972, 607). Al
though party platforms sometimes have been belittled as meaningless acts
of political rhetoric, there is considerable evidence that suggests that
platform pledges reach voters through indirect means and that once in of
fice parties do a reasonably good job of delivering on their pledges
(Pomper 1967, 1968; David 1971; Monroe 1983; Budge and Hofferbert
1990). While platforms clearly do not reflect the values of all the activists
in a particular party, they likely reflect the views of the mainstream party
activist at a particular time and place. As such, they are useful in a
longitudinal analysis of changes in the ideological mainstream of state and
national parties.
Because of the amateurism (impermanent headquarters, few re
sources, volunteer staff) that formerly characterized many state party
organizations, complete sets of party platforms over any length of time are
extremely rare. Consequently, a random sample of state Democratic
parties is out of the question. However, nearly complete sets of party
platforms were obtained from eleven state parties and the national party
for presidential election years between 1956 and 1980.2 Platform state
ments were content analyzed on the basis of the categories developed by
Ginsberg (1972, 1976).3 The Social Issues category was added to
Ginsberg’s categories because of its particular relevance to the time
period. The unit of analysis was the paragraph. Each paragraph was
scored on the basis of a five point scale measuring ideological direction.4
The following summarizes the seven categories and the five point scales
for each category (a score of 3 on each category indicates a vague or
neutral statement).
• Capitalism: the aggregation of wealth and control over the distribu
tion of wealth by the private sector.
Scores of 1 and 2 indicate commitment to the values of free enter
prise as a means of distributing benefits and burdens. Hostile to
government intervention in the private economy.
Scores of 4 and 5 indicate orientation toward public sector action
to regulate the private sector’s aggregation of wealth.
• Redistribution: the allocation of advantages in favor of the disadvan
taged.
1 and 2 indicate opposition to policies redistributing advantages.
4 and 5 indicate advocacy of policies redistributing advantages.
• Internal Sovereignty: the exercise of the power and increase of the
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role of the national government vis-a-vis the states and localities.
1 and 2 indicate opposition to federal intervention in state and
local affairs. (States’ rights orientation).
4 and 5 indicate support for a larger role for the national govern
ment vis-a-vis the states and localities.
• Labor, workers, organized labor, and policies regulating unions and
the workplace.
1 and 2 indicate negative, pro-management orientation toward
labor issues.
4 and 5 indicate positive, pro-union orientation toward labor
issues.
• Universalism: equality of rights and privileges for domestic minori
ties and women.
1 and 2 indicate opposition to policies requiring private or public
agencies to promote equal rights for minorities and women.
4 and 5 indicate support for policies promoting equality for mi
norities and women.
• Social Issue: the use of the coercive power of the state to regulate
private behavior based upon traditional moral standards.5
1 and 2 indicate support for policies preserving traditional values
and standards of behavior.
4 and 5 indicate the promotion of free expression and social ex
perimentation, and opposition to the use of the state’s power to
limit non-economic freedoms.
• Foreign/Defense: Actions concerning relations with foreign objects
and national security policy.
1 and 2 indicate advocacy of the use of military force or the threat
of military force to achieve American interests in the world.
4 and 5 indicate opposition to the use of military force to achieve
American interests in the world.6
Intra-Party Variation or Integration:
Measuring Party Nationalization
If ideological nationalization indeed occurred in the Democratic
party, one would expect a greater degree of intra-party integration of
platform statements as one moves through the period. The greatest amount
of intra-party ideological variation would be expected before the national
izing trends of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Standard deviations were
calculated to determine the extent of intra-party differences, the average
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amount of variation around the mean of the national and state parties for
each year in the study. Table 1 summarizes the standard deviation values
for each issue and year based on the average ideology scores. Table 2
presents similar figures for each state (the extent to which each state
differed from the mean scores of all the states in a particular year). An
empty cell in Table 1 indicates that the issue accounted for less than 1 per
cent of the state platforms in a particular year. An empty cell in Table 2
indicates that a state’s platform was unavailable for a particular year.
TABLE 1. Standard Deviations by Issue and Year: State and
National Democratic Parties, 1956-1980
Issue

Overall

Social Issue
Foreign/Defense
Universalism
Internal Sovereignty
Labor
Redistribution
Capitalism
OVERALL

1956

1960

1964 1968

«...

.62
.59
.52
.49
.44
.28
.25
.44

.53
.85
.74
.50
.32
.35
.58

—

—

.88
.66
.60
.25
.23
.57

.33
.31
.52
.29
.21
.35

1972

1976

1980

.80
.73
.29
.37
.27
.34
.24
.45

.72
.50
.17
.33
.25
.24
.20
.35

.42
.64
.15
.23
.33
.19
.25
.29

.50
.40
.27
.48
.41
.31
.22
.38

Note: An empty cell indicates that a platform was not obtained from that year.

TABLE 2. Standard Deviations by State and Year: State and National
Democratic Parties, 1956-1980
State

Overall 1956

Texas
North Carolina
West Virginia
Kansas
Rhode Island
North Dakota
Wisconsin
New Jersey
Maine
Connecticut
Illinois
National

.81
.69
.51
.47
.38
.37
.34
.32
.30
.30
.27
.20

1.42
.74
.34
.53
.32
.59
.43
.44
.33
.33
.19
.16

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1.10
1.28
.28
.41
.21
.31
.29
.31
.35
.30
.21
.30

...

.50
.61
.36
.49
.21
.29
.53
.24
.29
.41
.19
.22

.46
.45
.94
.61

.24
.32
.25
.27
.74
.30
.47

.25
.25
.35
.27
.51

.78
.32
.36
.09
.23
.32
.34
.23
.16
.24
.31

----

.29
.22
.33
.26
.37
.29
.18

---

.24
.18
.41
.10

----

.45
.17
.33
.18
.27
.09

Note: An empty cell indicates that a platform was not obtained from that year.

On the surface, it appears that there was movement toward greater
intra-party ideological integration after 1960. The highest overall standard
deviation values were measured in 1956 and 1960. With the exception of
1972, the overall standard deviation values dropped substantially after
1960. The decline in standard deviation values can be seen on all issues
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except the social issue and foreign/defense policy. The most obvious
decline in intra-party variation occurred on universalism and internal sov
ereignty. The significantly increased intra-party integration on universal
ism and internal sovereignty reflects the waning of a states’ rights-civil
rights division in the Democratic party after 1960. Early in the period, the
two southern parties—North Carolina and Texas-contributed to the great
est amount of intra-party variation. At a time when most state organiza
tions were pledging support for the Brown v. Board of Education decision,
the North Carolina and Texas parties preached the values of segregation
and states’ rights. By 1968, however, both southern parties moved into the
Democratic mainstream by pledging support for the national party’s civil
rights agenda. The speed of the transition of the North Carolina and Texas
parties from reactionary critics of civil rights to supporters of the national
party’s policies in this area is striking-so striking that it is tempting to
ascribe the transition partly to the 1964 national convention edict that state
parties choose their 1968 national convention delegates in a nondiscriminatory manner (Democratic National Committee 1967). The explanation
of this transition, however, is more likely related to changes in southern
society and politics than to nationalizing party reforms. Some scholars of
contemporary southern politics have suggested that as viable Republican
organizations began to develop in the South and court the region’s tradi
tional conservatism, the Democrats were forced to shift direction and seek
support from different constituencies. In an increasingly urban and bour
geois South, where blacks played a more important role in electoral
politics, the Democrats shifted their coalitional strategy to build a fragile
alliance between blacks and traditionally Democratic whites (see esp.
Lamis 1984). As such, something approximating a civil rights consensus
among the component parts of the national party had developed by the end
of the period.
The apparent increase in the divisiveness of social issues and of
foreign and defense issues is problematic because neither kind of issue was
particularly salient at the state level prior to 1968. Only in 1956 did
foreign and defense issues account for more than 1 per cent of the content
of state platforms during the 1956-1964 period. Hence, there is no
meaningful basis for comparison of standard deviation values. However,
the increasing salience of these types of issues in 1968 and after suggests
that, at least in some states, party activists began to emerge who were less
inclined to emphasize traditional New Deal economic issues and more
inclined to stress social issues and the increasingly divisive foreign policy
issues. Not unexpectedly, the relatively high standard deviation scores in
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1972 on social issues and foreign policy were related to the Vietnam War
and the proper response to domestic unrest related to that war. The
division was epitomized by the North Carolina party’s pledge to “oppose
draft card burning, . . . refusal to serve our country when needed, and
expressions of disloyalty to State and Nation.” Meanwhile the Wisconsin
Democrats called for “mandatory inquests in all deaths involving use of
weapons by law enforcement personnel,” and the North Dakota party
pledged to “abandon war or the threat of war as an instrument of national
policy” and to move toward an “international society” in which “war,
racism, and exploitation” will no longer “plague us.” Such pledges from
North Dakota Democrats were common in a state with a long tradition of
isolationist leanings. In fact, the relatively high standard deviation value
for foreign policy in 1956 was primarily the result of the North Dakota
party’s rejection of the Cold War consensus. By 1972, however, the
consensus had shattered, and North Dakota was more in line with the mean
ideology scores of the national party and the other state parties. The states
that lagged behind national trends and continued to support the Cold War
consensus (e.g. West Virginia) tended to have the highest standard devia
tion values in 1972.
TABLE 3. Mean Ideology Scores of Eleven State Democratic Parties and
the National Democratic Party, 1956-1980
Party

1956

1960 1964 1968

1972 1976 1980

Wisconsin
North Dakota
Maine
Connecticut
Illinois
New Jersey
Rhode Island
West Virginia
North Carolina
Texas
Kansas

3.83
3.92
3.32
3.68
3.39
3.00
3.33
3.47
3.14
2.30
3.00

3.62
3.18
3.50
3.30
3.32
3.27
3.42
3.34
3.05
2.33
3.04

3.85
3.32
3.53
3.68
3.67
3.58
3.56
3.21
2.93

3.85
3.89
3.42
3.71
3.60
3.47

3.86
3.65
3.37
3.55
3.44

-----

3.35

3.90
3.50
3.75
3.68
3.48
3.47
3.37
3.43
2.85
3.14
3.11

3.40
3.52
3.21
3.04

OVERALL STATE
NATIONAL PARTY

3.43
3.32

3.31
3.29

3.54
3.27

3.54
3.34

3.55
3.77

3.78

Overall

3.16
3.18
3.38
3.43
3.12

3.69
3.41
3.38
3.33
3.00
3.17
3.38
3.44
3.04

3.82
3.64
3.63
3.56
3.48
3.40
3.38
3.32
3.28
3.21
3.10

3.44
3.40

3.41
3.30

3.47
3.37

-----

-----

Note: An empty cell indicates that a platform was not obtained from that year.

The platforms give little indication of a substantial growth in liberal
activism in the party after 1968. Table 3 summarizes the average ideology
scores for the eleven state parties and the national party for each year in the
period. At least in terms of party platforms, 1972 appears to be the peak
year for liberal activism at the national level. Given the success of George
McGovern’s insurgent candidacy at the national party convention that
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year, this is clearly no surprise. Interestingly, however, the increasing
amateur activism in Democratic conventions in 1972 and after was not
reflected in the 1976 and 1980 platforms, both of which had mean
ideology scores very near the pre-1972 levels.
The figures in Table 3 also demonstrate remarkable stability over
time in the aggregate ideological orientations of the state parties. Not
unexpectedly, the states with more progressive political traditions, issueoriented politics, and moralistic political cultures (e.g. Wisconsin, North
Dakota, and Maine) had the most ideological platforms (i.e. they strayed
furthest from the 3.0 neutral position). More important to the central
questions of this study, however, is the fact that there was no clear
movement toward greater liberal activism as one moves through the
period. During the more “ideological” elections of 1964, 1968, and 1972
(see Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976), the state parties did show a slight
tendency toward greater policy specificity, but not to a major degree. In
sum, the increasing issue-oriented activism of national convention dele
gates associated with party reform had little impact on the ideological
orientations of both the state and national platforms.
Summary
The evidence suggests that there was some movement toward intra
party integration in the Democratic party during the 1960s and 1970s.
Although it is impossible to demonstrate a causal link, this integration was
probably the result of a growing civil rights consensus among Democrats
that probably had little to do with the nationalizing reforms of the 1960s
and 1970s. As the conservative, segregationist wing of the party moved
toward the Republicans, the southern Democratic party began to court the
region’s newly enfranchised blacks. As such, the intra-party division on
civil rights issues virtually disappeared. Although intra-party differences
emerged in 1972 and after on foreign policy and social issues, they never
accounted for as much intra-party variation as the civil rights/states’ rights
issues did in 1956 and 1960.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Democratic platforms from
the period was the relative ideological stability from election to election.
With a few exceptions, most of the organizations demonstrated remark
able consistency in their platform statements throughout the period. This
finding is consistent with similar research on Republican organizations’
platforms during the same period (Paddock 1991).
While the data show a modest movement toward intra-party ideo
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logical integration, Democratic platforms give little hint of the develop
ment of a philosophically cohesive and nationalized party. Rather, what
emerged from the period appears to have been a slight trend toward the na
tionalization of campaign platform content in what traditionally has been a
decentralized American party system. This is consistent with, but not
particularly fortifying of, the recent literature on party nationalization and
integration.
NOTES
'The twenty-four year period dates from 1956 to 1980. The midpoint year of this
period is 1968, the year of the Democrats’ tumultuous national convention and the
beginning of the party’s major nationalizing reforms. This allows for a longitudinal
analysis of Democratic platforms over a period in which the party was allegedly
transformed from a pragmatic, decentralized majority party in the New Deal setting to a
more nationalized and ideological party in the post-New Deal setting.
2Platforms were gathered from both Republican and Democratic parties as part of
a broader research project (see Paddock, 1991). It is difficult to obtain platforms of both
parties for an extended period. Many state parties never drafted the documents. In the
state parties that did draft them, there was often little consistency in the periodicity of
such endeavors. Platforms were obtained from Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maine,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. These states clearly do not fully capture the variety of party organizations,
political subcultures and electoral systems in the United States, but they do reflect con
siderable diversity. However, because of the lack of a complete universe of state Demo
cratic platforms, the findings of this study must be treated with caution. Presidential
election years were chosen because they represent a consistent four year interval for the
purpose of longitudinal comparison. In the states (e.g. New Jersey) in which party
platforms were drafted in non-presidential election years, the platform from the year
closest to the presidential year was used (e.g., the 1965 New Jersey platform was used
for 1964.)
3Ginsberg’s categories were used because they are general enough to allow a wide
variety of policy statements (common in state party platforms) to be coded.
4The five-point scale measures both ideological direction and the degree of policy
specificity. The scores of 1 and 2, for example, are both in the same ideological direc
tion, but represent varying degrees of specificity. A 1 is a stronger, more issue specific
statement than a 2. Hence, the five-point scale should be viewed as a continuum on
which 3 is a vague or neutral position. The further one moves from the center, the
greater is the policy specificity in a particular ideological direction. For example, the
following statement from the 1980 Wisconsin Democratic platform was coded as a 5 on
capitalism because it clearly articulated a strong position toward taking a public sector
action to control the private sector’s aggregation of wealth: “We call for the nationaliza
tion of all energy producing companies, so that energy will be produced for the benefit of
the many rather than for the profit of the few.” Far more common, however, were
statements such as the following from the 1976 North Dakota Democratic platform: “We
support a continuing investigation of all major oil companies by the Congress of the
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United States.” This statement was coded as a 4 because while it clearly favored public
sector action to control the private sector, the position was not as clear (nor the proposed
action as severe) as in the Wisconsin pledge.
These examples illustrate the unavoidably subjective nature of content analysis.
Because of this subjective component, care was taken to insure coder reliability. Intra
coder reliability tests (using a random sample of 10 percent of the platforms from the
period) were done on all categories and averaged .90 overall. Intra-coder reliability was
calculated by dividing the number of scores on which there was agreement between the
two coding periods by the sum of all scores for both periods. Intra-coder reliability
scores for each category are as follows: Capitalism .90, Redistribution .88, Internal
Sovereignty .86, Labor .93, Universalism .90, Social Issue .83, Foreign/Defense .90.
These figures also include the analysis of Republican state and national platforms that
were part of a broader study. Because of the relatively small number of mentions of the
Social Issue (overall it accounted for slightly less than 4 per cent of all platform
statements), its relatively low intra-coder reliability score had little impact on the overall
value.
5Because of the lower reliability of the Social Issue and the fact that the category
has not been employed in the previous literature on party platforms, further elaboration
on the scale ratings seems warranted. Statements scored 1 and 2 emphasized maintain
ing the existing social fabric as a higher value than the promotion of libertarian
lifestyles, free expression, and social experimentation. An example of “social decay” is
identified (e.g. lawlessness, drug abuse, liberalized sexual mores) and solutions are
recommended (e.g. support for law and order, tougher drug laws, and opposition to birth
control, abortion, and homosexuality). An example is this statement from the 1968
Texas Democratic Platform:
We call on all Texans to support the proper actions o f their police. Let there be an
end, we pray, to the encouragement o f civil disobedience, to over-permissiveness;
to undue tolerance o f criminals, rioters and anarchists, and to the indifferent
acceptance o f obscenity, immorality, and degradation as a new way of life in this
country.
A statement was coded a 3 when the party deliberately avoided taking a position relating
to state regulation of private behavior (e.g. abortion, school prayer, drug usage). An
example is this statement from the 1976 Maine Democratic platform:
The complex subject o f the rights of the unborn and o f the women carrying them
has been the subject o f intense discussion. . . . The Platform Committee feels it is
impossible to arrive at a consensual opinion. . . . We therefore recommend taking
no position.
Statements coded as 4 and 5 emphasized freedom and social experimentation (e.g. right
to protest, right to an abortion, legalization of marijuana) as higher values than state
regulations to maintain existing social mores. An example is this statement from the
1972 Maine Democratic Platform:
The Democratic Party opposes criminal penalties for private acts which are
considered "victim-less” crimes. We also recommend a review of the statutes to
eliminate those laws which attempt to dictate morals and values to the people,
recognizing the individual's right to determine his own acts in private, provided
such acts do not impinge upon the rights of others.
6As Wittkopf (1986; 1987) notes, foreign policy attitudes can be conceptualized

134

IDEOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
by two, rather than one dimension of conflict: support for and opposition to cooperative
internationalism, and support for and opposition to militant internationalism. From
these two dimensions Wittkopf develops four types of foreign policy attitudes: accommodationist, internationalist, isolationist, and hardliner. In order to maintain consis
tency with the other categories in this analysis (which have one dimension of conflict)
the Foreign/Defense category measures only the militant internationalism dimension.
While this does not capture the depth of the foreign policy debate, it allows for
operational consistency with an issue that was not a major part of the state party
platforms.
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